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
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2. Rothenburg ob der Tauber
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Voters give Helmut Kohl a decisive victory

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's conservative coalition has won a decisive victory in general election. The CDU/CSU received 48.8 per cent of the vote compared with 44.5 per cent in 1980. It will hold 244 (226) of the 497 seats in the Bundestag. The SPD, under Hans-Jochen Vogel, saw its share of the vote fall from 42.9 per cent in 1980 to 38.2 per cent, and its parliamentary representation drop from 218 to 183. The party which aligned itself with the CDU last year, goes back with a reduced share of the poll and the Greens are elected for the first time at national level (See table below).

Conservative hopes of being able to govern for four years with the FDP have been realised.

Now that this *bürgerliche Koalition* gained a clear victory in the general election it need no longer worry about the future.

Now has the time to put its policies into practice. It can continue what it set out to achieve, and it has plenty of time.

FDP slogans could not prevent this victory. The SPD spoke of "social injustice" of "redistribution from the top", merging into a "policy for the poor".

conservatives' lack of good slogans with political content proved unimportant.

Neither did the missiles issues exert a significant influence. The SPD Chancellor candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, said he hoped to keep new missiles out of Germany. This was, he said, in contrast to other parties, which were intent on placing them on German soil.

The election must also be regarded as a success for the FDP, considering

with the Liberals' change of course, the scars of the "betrayal" campaign, the claims that a vote for the Liberals is a wasted vote as they wouldn't get more than the required five per cent anyway, are just a few of the political punches that had to be taken.

The "majority left of the CDU" triumphantly claimed by Willy Brandt when the conservatives failed last year in the election in Hesse, did not happen.

The support for the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition is a vote of confidence in its two main protagonists, Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Above all, voters have given a clear go-ahead to the direction in which coalition policies are moving.

On the one hand, this means policies aimed at overcoming the economic crisis and unemployment by releasing entrepreneurial potential, reorganising government spending and pursuing austerity measures in social-policy fields.

On the other hand, voters would like to see a foreign policy which sets out to maintain security and peace via a balance between East and West and which strengthens the Atlantic alliance, particularly through closer ties to America.

Both policy components, balance of power and strengthening the Alliance, are backed by the electorate.

This means that the Federal Republic would agree to new missiles on German soil if the option hoped for in Geneva for land-based medium-range missiles fails because of Soviet disagreement.

This vote is at the same time a public mandate: the Kohl/Genscher government must stick to its security policy unwaveringly, and not give in to the peace movement, no matter how loud its protest becomes.

Johann Georg Reissmüller
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 7 March 1983)



Moment of triumph: Helmut Kohl and his wife, Hannelore.
(Photo: Poly-Press)

The Greens just make it

The Greens have managed to move into the Bundestag. They were optimistic right up until election day despite the growing number of skeptics who believed that they would not clear the compulsory five per cent hurdle.

Forecasts over the past few weeks were not good. They said the Greens had slipped from over eight per cent a few months back to just under five per cent.

The economic programme they adopted a few weeks ago at the special party conference in Sindelfingen had been publicly torn to pieces and the environmentalists found themselves under severe attack from both the CDU and the Social Democrats.

But the leaders, led by Lukas Beckmann, were not put off by the gloomy forecasts.

Their election campaign was quite expensive by their standards (DM 75,000 according to their estimates).

They tried to get their message across to the most important target groups. This would seem to have been successful.

A group of entertainers calling itself the "Green Caterpillar" put on concerts in almost all the big German cities. Udo Lindenberg, Wolf Biermann and Bettina Wegener were just some of the better known stars appearing. This seems to have particularly attracted first-time and young voters.

The intensive second-vote campaign also seemed to have played its part in allowing the Greens to edge into Parliament.

However, the real problems facing the new party in Parliament are still to come.

Election slogans such as "Let the Republic become greener" are not likely to be successful now that the established parties have stepped up their efforts towards environmental protection.

The practical implementation of the rotation principle adopted in Sindelfingen (all Green members of Parliament must be replaced after two years) may come up against legal problems.

The man in the street and the traditional parliamentary parties are already wondering about how the Greens will behave in Parliament.

How will the new party get on with the other parties, particularly with the SPD?

The Greens will now have to reveal their real structure. Will they develop into a proper party? Or will they remain just a movement containing members of different political currents?

Will the Greens make a big adjustment in an effort to push through their ecological objectives? Or will they try to transform society via their "fundamental opposition"?

Their future will depend on the answers.

R. V. Volkovskiy
(Die Welt, 7 March 1983)

How the parties fared compared with previous polls

	1983 Percent of Poll	October 1980 Percent	October 1976 Percent
CDU/CSU	48.8 (244 seats)	44.5 (226 seats)	48.6 (243 seats)
SPD	38.2 (183 seats)	42.9 (218 seats)	42.6 (214 seats)
FDP	8.9 (34 seats)	10.6 (53 seats)	7.9 (39 seats)
Greens	5.8 (27 seats)	1.5	—
Others	0.5	0.5	0.9
Turnout	89.1	88.6	90.7

THE EEC

Farm surpluses remain centre of concern

A long-serving foreign minister of a major EEC country sees a possibility that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could cause a major clash at the EEC summit in Stuttgart in June. He says she might even leave the conference "under dramatic circumstances."

Gaston Thorn, president of the EEC Commission, sees the possibility of a "severe Community crisis before the end of the years."

Other diplomats and the more farsighted of the Euro-MPs also speak of severe problems in the offing for the Community.

All EEC governments, the Commission and the European Parliament have in one way or another been instrumental in charting this crisis-bound course.

And since the issues at stake are money and power, they all feel that only a severe tremor will prompt the Community to seek new solutions.

Both Margaret Thatcher and the British Labour Party, which is likely to push for Britain to leave the Community in the general election campaign that will probably be held towards the end of the year, are important factors.

The number one problem is the huge stockpiles of EEC farm surpluses involving such commodities as grain, butter and dried milk.

Portugal and Spain: grapes of wrath

The four-year negotiations about the enlargement of the EEC through the membership of Spain and Portugal have lent a new dimension to the Community's own North-South problems.

The present southern members of the Community (Italy, Greece and the south of France) now insist that the Community owes solidarity first and foremost to its existing members in the south.

As the French see it, the EEC must first concern itself with the existing producers of typical southern farm products before entering the decisive negotiating phase with Spain and Portugal.

No matter how difficult and costly it is to realise, the contemplated agricultural measures will not be enough to overcome the backwardness of southern regions. As a result, there have for years been demands for a special Community development programme for the Mediterranean regions.

The Commission has in fact been working on such a programme for the past 18 months.

But what has now been presented to the press by the Commission's Italian Vice-president, Lorenzo Natali, is both spectacular and meagre.

Incidentally, Natali refused to release the text of the new "Integrated Mediterranean Programme".

And what he did say about it was so vague as to make it impossible to arrive at an evaluation.

He spoke of a six-year programme involving 6.6bn ecu (DM1.5bn) and mentioned the regions that are supposed to benefit.

But he said nothing about whether the funds are available or whether the money still has to be raised.

He said that the Commission considered that the present financing sources of the EEC would be inadequate for future needs.

There could hardly have been a poorer presentation of a good project.

Carl A. Ehrhardt
(Handelsblatt, 25 February 1983)



spending must be pared down drastically; but this is bound to founder on opposition from France, Ireland, Greece and Denmark, for whom farm exports are vital if they are to keep their balances of trade on an even keel.

Another stumbling block is the Benelux countries which favour another approach, i.e. the assignment of new functions to the Community and the allocation of the necessary funds. In other words, a boosting of the Community budget.

The rejection in the current election campaign of any moves to boost EEC revenues before Spain and Portugal join the only bit of common ground between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the SPD chancellorship contender Hans-Joachim Vogel.

Any added German funds for Brussels would have to be provided by more government borrowing or higher taxation, and none of the political parties is prepared to go that far.

Problem number two is that Britain was reimbursed DM2bn of the payments it made to the EEC in 1982 in a complicated procedure that involved a supplementary EEC budget for 1983.

The number three problem has to do with the fact that Euro-MPs have come to realise that the issue of British contributions to the EEC has given them the power to force the Community to develop further.

The point is that the European Parliament has considerable powers regarding the budget and could stop future offset payments to London.

So this leaves two approaches still open. On the one hand, EEC farm

Genscher still has hopes for Euro Act

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher still hopes that the European Act will be adopted. The Act is an initiative by Genscher and his Italian opposite number, Colombo, aimed at revitalising the idea of a politically united Europe.

But the Community foreign ministers who met in Bonn for the specific purpose of discussing the Act don't seem to have made any headway, despite the fact that Genscher spoke of "substantial progress." He revealed no details.

It is becoming increasingly likely now that, due to the deep-rooted problems in the Community, the Act will remain an ideal.

Genscher's original aim was to have a proper treaty on the unification of Europe. He later watered this down to a "sovereign Act" that would encompass activities outside the Treaties of Rome and make non-military security issues and cultural affairs the subject of regular Community consultations. He also wanted to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament.

But he said nothing about whether the funds are available or whether the money still has to be raised.

He said that the Commission considered that the present financing sources of the EEC would be inadequate for future needs.

There is already talk of new vast agricultural farm surpluses that will call for additional export subsidies — and this in turn will aggravate relations with America's agricultural policy makers.

To add to this, the membership of

pean Act. They can at best be alleviated. It is up to the national governments. The use of the Community's vast domestic market as a means of restoring international competitiveness has founded on the subsidies race between the individual member nations and potty protectionism.

The third major problem is the EEC finances. The future Bonn government will have to put its cards on the table during the remaining months of the German presidency of the EEC Council.

The British contribution problems have only temporarily been settled, and the relief the development of the dollar exchange rate has provided for the financial aspect of the Community agriculture market is also only temporary. The same applies to the current high world market prices.

Other issues, such as security policy, have long been the subject of consultations anyway wherever Nato and EEC provisions permit.

The real problems like mass unemployment cannot be solved by Euro-

HOME AFFAIRS

Wörner reveals his blueprint for changes at the Defence Ministry

The Green paper took some of the sails of European politicians and cautiously drew the governments' attention to a way out of British dilemma: Either by taking a portion of VAT of the member nations in relative to their GNP (which goes at the expense of Germany and the Benelux countries) or large farm surpluses.

The Ministry of Defence will not run short of cash again, says the Minister, Manfred Wörner (CDU). There were still weak spots in the Ministry, he told the 5,300 employees in Berlin. Ireland was in question how he wants to run the organisation. But it was nevertheless manageable to it. But it was nevertheless manageable to it. Under the former SPD Minister, Hans Apel, the Ministry ran into cash problems. At the centre of the problem was the new Tornado fighter-bomber.

One of the more startling facts during Herr Apel's last two years in the Thatcher government — aside, the rising cost of the Tornado — was that these figures are not necessarily open to a straight comparison. But pointing to them as a quasi excuse was still unnecessary.

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— 175,000 of them civilians. Of the

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■ GERMANY

Reichstag fire was 50 years ago and still the debate goes on

Late in the evening on February 27, 1933, Berliners were startled out of their sleep by the sound of howling sirens.

The Reichstag was on fire. During the night German radio broadcast excited reports on the fire.

At the scene, the police had arrested a Dutch journeyman by the name of Marinus van der Lubbe, whose activities and behaviour that evening seemed to leave no doubt as to his guilt.

For the Nazis this was a clear-cut case; van der Lubbe was a pawn in the Communist-socialist plot to overthrow the new government.

A little less than one week before the

New evidence uncovered

A former American prosecutor during the Nuremberg war crimes trials says that he has traced new witnesses to the fire which burnt down the Reichstag in 1933. Former prosecutor Kempner, now a lawyer in Frankfurt, has given the names to the West German Federal Supreme Court with the aim of getting a retrial.

No decision has yet been made. Kempner has been trying for years to get a retrial in the interest of the brother of the man accused at the time of committing the crime, the Dutchman Marinus van der Lubbe, who was subsequently executed.

Kempner had to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court because the higher regional court in Berlin had decided on December 20, 1982, that a retrial was not permissible, since West Germany's knows no "succession" court for the Reichsgericht.

This decision is "at least rather curious" as it runs contrary to another decision taken by the Federal Supreme Court, which is not however regarded as binding by the court in Berlin.

Kempner, who questioned Göring on the Reichstag fire during the Nuremberg trials, now states that Göring admitted that there was no investigation into the cause of the fire. Hitler had said that the Communist set it alight and Göring was instructed to tell this to the press.

At least this was the version Göring told Kempner in October 1945 in Nuremberg.

The two new witnesses are the former head of the Gestapo, Rudolf Diel; and a war-time comrade of Göring, who claims to have heard a "confession" by the Luftwaffe Captain (and later General) Loerzer.

According to Kempner, Diel already stated years ago that Göring organised the burning of the Reichstag. Van der Lubbe was just "a poor little devil".

On the very next day after the fire, Loerzer admitted to the other witness in the Berlin Aerobus station.

"I don't know what all the guessing is about; my former fellow Luftwaffe pilot Göring told me to set fire to the place, and I was helped by a few members of the SA".

According to Kempner, the two men

SONNTAGSBLATT

last multi-party election to the Reichstag (March 5, 1933), the NSDAP had at last found rousing material to back their election slogan "Fight the Marxists".

Hitler's party, opposed to democracy, declared itself to be the spokesman of the moral indignation at the attack on the symbol of Weimar parliamentarism.

At long last they had found a pretext for putting their extensively prepared programme of arrests into practice.

Early in the morning on February 28, 1933, about 4,000 Communist and Social Democratic party officials, journalists and writers were taken into party or police custody, usually in a most brutal manner. The unrestrained torrent of Nazi propaganda was to show its ugly face during the course of 1933.

Despite great pressure by the political police, the Leipzig trial on the burning of the Reichstag ended with a verdict of not guilty in 1933. Former prosecutor Kempner, now a lawyer in Frankfurt, has given the names to the West German Federal Supreme Court with the aim of getting a retrial.

The German Supreme Court at the time was not able to place the responsibility for the fire at the doorstep of the KPD or the NSDAP.

To attempt the latter would undoubtedly have endangered the lives of the judges themselves.

Open dissent cost White Rose students their lives

Forty years ago, on February 22, 1943, Sophie Scholl, her brother Hans and their friend Christoph Probst were sentenced to death in the Plötzensee prison in Berlin.

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However, not only left-wing circles but also the Conservatives had considerable reason to suspect the Nazis as being the real culprits.

No-one put it past them. On January 31, 1933, for example, Goebbels had stated that "the Bolshevik attempt at revolution would have to flare up first" so as to be able to crush the political enemy.

The suspicion centred on the fact that it was virtually impossible for one individual to have set the whole Reichstag alight.

Rumours spread that an SA commando had entered the Reichstag via an underground passage leading from the palace of the Reichspräsident, where Göring lived, to the Reichstag building itself and then set it alight.

Although there is no general agreement on who committed arson in this case, historical research increasingly tends to support the more simple likelihood. This would mean that van der Lubbe alone, in attempt to provide a signal against Hitler's course of terror and warmongering, had committed the crime.

However, the historical and political significance of the date February 27, 1933, is not solely concerned with the question of criminal responsibility for the Reichstag fire and its consequences perhaps represent the most important step on the way to Nazification of the "street" had been taken with the help of Conservative politicians who obtained the emergency decree on February 28, 1933, a climate of "legal uncertainty" had been created.

Together with the permanent emergency, this paved the way for the Enabling Act (*Erlassensgesetz*) on March 23, 1933, which provided a legal support for the sphere of uncertainty.

tion of the People and the State, Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, February 28, 1933.

The "Reichstag Fire Decree" was called, removed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Weimar constitution and re-introduced the penalty for high treason, arson and

further law, issued after the election campaign has thrown up the businessman again as the bogeyman of the nation. According to sentence van der Lubbe to de-

He was sent to the guillotine business community is threatening

And the SPD party leader, Willy Brandt, says: "Big money is rallying forces against the workers."

But opinion polls suggest that these

news are not shared by the population

large.

The old truism (taken from a German secondary school textbook) to the effect that the boss rakes it in while the workers sweat it out seems to be a favourite of educationists.

These intellectuals, whether they are genuine or merely self-styled, are quick to generalise their economic wisdom through unpopular measures to the general public being fully execrable.

But most people have different ideas. While the businessman is not exactly idolised, his public image has been improving steadily.

It is an image that fluctuates with the ups and downs of the economy and there is still room for improvement. But

it is no longer seen as the villain, that

the electorate try and depict him as,

it is surprising that even young people

don't agree with the textbook image

of the businessman.

Despite or perhaps because of the

economic woes the entrepreneur's image has changed: What has happened is that prejudices have been broken down over the past three decades.

Opinion surveys in 1950 showed that

60 per cent of respondents said that all

the businessman thought of was profit,

only 16 per cent thought he had any

sense of social responsibility.

The picture was rather different in 1976: 39 per cent admitted that he had, in 1980, 38 per cent thought he had

and 41 per cent that he hadn't.

The pollsters also found out that the

workers were becoming less keen to

change places with the boss.

In 1980 two-thirds would not change

places and only one-third considered

the businessman's independence worth

clenching of fists in the pocket.

It also turned out that young people's dissatisfaction with the existing economic order rose in direct proportion to

the level of education.

Opinion polls in 1973 and 1979 and

University, and finally in Japan involving young people between the ages of 15 and 19 came up with some

interesting facts:

In 1979, 66 per cent considered that

businessmen do run high risks commercially;

the figure was 53 per cent in 1973.

In 1979, 45 per cent agreed that busi-

nessmen earned a lot but that they

worked harder than other people

(1973: 35 per cent);

Asked whether businessmen said

they were worse off than they were in

1973, 50 per cent answered yes in 1979 (1973: 5 p.m. in the Plötzensee prison).

But there still remains a great deal of

optimism among young people. They

are large and approve of free enterprise

more than a planned economy but are

not clear about the way it functions.

This is shown by their ideas about

business profits.

Another important point with ASH is

that the two refuse to compete among

themselves.

"In any normal business there is the

competition among the staff plus the

competition with other businesses,"

they say. "If we were to get an order to

ASH, on the other hand, wants to

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PUBLIC ATTITUDES

The once-unloved businessman slowly loses the exploiting-villain image

All opinion surveys show that the wrong picture of the entrepreneur is caused by disinformation. The better informed a respondent in these surveys and the more involved in business, the more realistic is his assessment of the boss.

The revival of certain clichés as a means of fueling the election campaign will therefore prove a flop with the very people that matter. The citizen has made it clear in opinion surveys that the moth-eaten class struggle clichés are not worth taking out of the cupboard.

It is impossible at this stage to answer the question as to whether an economic boom makes the entrepreneur more likable than a slump does.

He is seen as "likeable" in boom years because he secures jobs and pays high wages (out of his high profits). But by the same token, it has also been said in boom times that the entrepreneur refuses to raise wages and fringe benefits although he could — allegedly — easily pay for them.

In a slump, the public is bound to discover that there is a connection between profits, investments and jobs. But this does not prevent some people from making the entrepreneur bear all the blame for inevitable layoffs.

It was former DGB boss Heinz Oskar Vetter rather than some captain of industry who said: "It is more difficult now than ever before to be an entrepreneur."

People find it hard to understand that only those who make a profit can do something for society as a whole.

Peter Gillies

(Die Welt, 24 February 1983)

15 to 20 people are still easy enough to oversee to make such equality feasible.

Many of these alternative businesses have financial problems. There is hardly a bank that will give them credit since virtually none of them can offer any collateral. Netzwerk Selbsthilfe, an organisation promoting alternative projects, tries to help where possible.

The organisation, which is financed through contributions and membership dues and has

FINANCE

After Bretton Woods — as seen by Bundesbank chief

The author, Karl Otto Pöhl, is president of the Bundesbank. In 1973, together with the then Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger, he played a major role in the negotiations that ultimately led to floating exchange rates.

It is exactly ten years since 1 March 1973 when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates that had been established some 25 years earlier collapsed for good.

Following the examples of a number of other central banks, the Bundesbank discontinued its intervention on foreign exchange markets, having had to buy no less than \$2.7bn on a single day, which at that time was the equivalent of DM7.5bn.

This was the biggest amount ever to have been bought or sold by a central bank on a single day. It also spelled the dramatic end to a crisis that had wracked the international monetary system for years.

Widely differing developments in the major industrial countries and above all the inflation of the dollar, the key currency in the system, became incompatible with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates, more so since it proved impossible to correct exchange rates that had become unrealistic in time.

The Bundesbank was one of the main victims of the fixed exchange rate system and its shortcomings. This resulted in a massive capital influx into Germany, which led to an intolerable inflation of the domestic money supply.

Between the end of January and the beginning of March 1973, some DM24bn in foreign currency flowed into the Bundesbank.

Neither administrative curtailments of the capital flow nor skimming off of the added liquidity created by constant foreign exchange purchases could in the long run stop this importation of inflation.

To rid itself of the obligation to buy foreign exchange and to let the deutschmark float had thus become an absolute necessity for the Bundesbank.

The world monetary system and Germany's anti-inflationary policy would probably have been spared a lot of trouble had the world summoned the courage to depart from the Bretton Woods system as early as 1971.

The deutschmark exchange rate had been permitted to float temporarily at the time. But it proved impossible to induce the other EC countries to agree to a "common flotation" against the dollar.

After the United States abolished the gold standard for the dollar in 1971, there was an attempt to return to fixed exchange rates in the form of the Smithsonian Agreement.

The final decision to let currencies float in March 1973 was immediately followed by efforts to regain monetary stability, which had become gravely endangered.

The Bundesbank raised the rates for short-term bank refinancing drastically, to as much as a peak of 16 per cent — thus skimming off liquidity.

In May 1973, the Bonn government decided to embark on a stabilisation

programme to buttress the Bundesbank's measures.

Due to the regained monetary autonomy, the Bundesbank succeeded in subsequent years in uncoupling its own currency from the international inflationary conveyor belt that was rapidly gathering momentum after the 1973 oil price explosion.

The call for more stable exchange rates can therefore be heard time and again. In fact, there are even those who advocate a return to the Bretton Woods system.

The question is: How can the exchange rates of the most important currencies be stabilised?

Experience over the past ten years has shown that even massive central bank intervention has only a limited effect.

For instance: The Bundesbank spent no less than DM27.6bn in 1980, depleting its reserves, without having been able to stop the depreciation of the deutschmark.

There will be tense situations in the future as well — situations to which our monetary policy will have to respond with pragmatism and flexibility.

Nobody can assess the cost of the depreciations and appreciations that have occurred in the past, but it is bound to be considerable. The more so considering that some of the exchange rate fluctuations did not serve to adapt to changed fundamentals but were the result of speculative capital movements.

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The question is: How can the exchange rates of the most important currencies be stabilised?

Experience over the past ten years has shown that even massive central bank intervention has only a limited effect.

For instance: The Bundesbank spent no less than DM27.6bn in 1980, depleting its reserves, without having been able to stop the depreciation of the deutschmark.

Cooperation

The central bank of Japan had a similar experience in 1982.

Even so, it would be wrong to go overboard and discontinue intervention on foreign exchange markets. I still consider it meaningful for central banks to cooperate closely in an effort to prevent erratic exchange rate fluctuations — or at least to dampen them.

Administrative controls of the capital flow are unlikely to do any good. In fact, they are not even feasible for such international currencies as the dollar and the deutschmark. Moreover, they would not only spell the beginning of the end of the free flow of money and capital but in the long run also of the free flow of goods and services.

Preparations for concerned meetings that will meet in Wiesbaden must start immediately.

The most pressing thing would be to reduce real interest rates because this would inevitably bring about a world-wide depression.

Countries that had managed to

boost their inflation under control can

boost the world economy by a growth-oriented policy.

"Additional investment, growing employment promotion" would be possible in the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance. It would have to be coordinated with other nations because nothing is achieved with unilateral national measures alone."

As Schmidt sees it, the minimum demand to be placed on the participants not to introduce any protectionist measures in 24 months.

In addition, Schmidt called for stable exchange rates, even closer cooperation among central banks.

Arriving at a common policy of stability, fiscal, solidarity and foreign trade balance in the major industrial countries is much more important than formally introducing a system of fixed exchange rates.

By pursuing such a policy governments and central banks could contribute most towards stabilising the World Monetary System and thus creating an important precondition for economic growth and more jobs.

Karl Otto Pöhl
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 24 February 1983)

13 March 1983

1076 - 13 March 1983

THE GERMAN TRIBUNE

Schmidt urges a halt to protectionism

Western industrialised countries should avoid introducing protectionist measures for two reasons, says former Bonn Minister Ludwig Erhard.

The cost of the products were a thorn in the authority's side for years. It took time as far as the highest court in the case of谷和利。

They also must try and reduce the cost of the products were a thorn in the authority's side for years. It took time as far as the highest court in the case of谷和利.

It keeps battling on wherever it goes.

But this is all water under the bridge. Erhard had to make a number of concessions, but prevailed in essence.

The business community has meanwhile come to terms with the monopolies legislation, and the cartel office has been exercising its watchdog function as well as it can, incensing the public whenever a major price-fixing deal is uncovered — as recently with the construction industry.

This led to more stringent supervision and to merger controls.

The development of the German monopoli

ies legislation shows that the law-

makers have become increasingly wary of concerns that dominate the market.

This led to more stringent supervision and to merger controls.

The ban on resale price maintenance has met with general public approval.

But the constant improvements of legislation against unfair competition has also caused new problems. While legislation allows cooperation between small and medium companies within certain limits, it has been stiffened for huge, market-dominating companies and groups of companies.

There are those who argue that cartels are not the only obstacle to free competition. Powerful individual companies can also be a danger. The general view is that a healthy blend of companies of differing sizes is the best guarantee of free competition in the long run.

Many things look less grim in retrospect than they were at the time when the office had to arrive at a decision.

For example, the go-ahead for the merger between the Neckermann mail-order company and the Karstadt department store chain. Today it is quite obvious that the merger with a loss company has hardly strengthened Karstadt.

The perspectives in the Grundig consumer electronics company have also changed.

When Grundig was doing well and making a bid to take over its competitor, Saba, the cartel office stopped the deal, saying that the merger would give Grundig too much weight on the market.

Now the French Thomson-Brandt concern is making a bid for Grundig, which itself needs a reliable partner.

All this does not mean that the impact of mergers should be minimised. But the cartel office must not see its function solely in protecting medium-sized companies.

Ultimately, the only yardstick of competition is the ability or otherwise of our industry to come up with good new products, streamline production methods and keep its profit margins reasonable so that the consumer can buy at a sensible price.

Seen in this light, competition does not depend on the quality of anti-trust legislation and its implementation. Government subsidies and guarantees have as much of an effect as do the ups and downs of the economy as a whole.

Competition naturally becomes livelier in a recession; but, by the same token, many companies would rather not compete but join forces when the overall economic going gets tough.

One of the controversial issues in merger control proceedings is whether or not the companies involved can dominate a market to the point where they no longer have to fear competition.

Large companies frequently contend that the yardsticks applied by the cartel office are too theoretical.

The office, on the other hand, deplores the fact that it is pretty powerless against mergers — especially in the retail business.

Industry complains that the office's attention is riveted on the domestic market and disregards the fact that the

BUSINESS

Case of the tranquiliser that caused palpitations

he tranquilisers valium and librium, produced by Hoffmann-La Roche, a double effect: they tranquilised patients, all right, but they caused agitation at the Berlin headquarters of the federal cartel office.

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Cartel office's Wolfgang Karte ... 'retail mergers must end.' (Photo: Sven Simon)

companies concerned have to compete on European and world markets as well.

Karte, on the other hand, points to the "anguished cries of those small businessmen who are being strangled by the big fellows."

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PERSPECTIVE

Reliable influence over Soviet leaders must be aim of counter threats'

In this article, Dr Lothar Riehl, state secretary at the Ministry of Defence, takes a closer look at the West's position on arms control.

Arms limitations cannot be considered a policy in itself. The renunciation of arms according to number and type alone does not guarantee true security.

The West's arms control policy has always been geared towards maintaining stable security within a conflict-laden relationship to the Soviet Union.

All negotiation proposals put forward by the West dealing with troop reductions, the limitation of military movements or restricting the strategic arms build-up have and will remain oriented towards security stability.

This basic principle applies to Western policies designed to mutually limit the amount of land-based intermediate-range projectile weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union to as low a level as possible, a negotiation objective of the North Atlantic alliance laid down in the double-decision to deploy and negotiate.

The offer made to re-examine arms requirements "in the light of concrete negotiation results" included the complete renunciation of American projectile weapons right from the start.

The deployment of those weapons, however, is viewed by the partners to the alliance as an essential backing-up and intensification of its regional capacity to deter an attack on Europe by means of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and able to reach Soviet territory.

The requirement for such a renunciation, however, is a corresponding and equivalent renunciation on the part of the Soviet Union with regard to its medium-range (1,000 up to 5,500 km) land-based projectile weapons.

This ambitious objective may describe the optimal solution of the problem for arms control, yet not necessarily the optimal solution for the balance of power, which should provide Europe with a support and stability in these times of conflicting East-West relations.

It is imperative for the security of those countries in the western part of the continent, which stand in the shadows of Soviet missiles and bombers, tanks and guns, and are only a few early-warning minutes away from missiles stationed in West Russia, that an effective counter-threat exerts a reliable influence on the military success and risk calculations made by the Soviet leadership.

In a state of conflict, every consideration of military options must show the risk of a war in Europe to be too great, even in the event of a clear superiority of Warsaw Pact countries in the field of offensive forces ready-for-use in Europe.

A calculably high action risk is the element of effective deterrence which should be developed by the West in its arms policy, defence planning and defence readiness in regard to all Soviet military options.

The only thing that ought to remain incalculable for the aggressor is the reaction of the defending party and thus the exact course for further escalation.

Since Nato's longer-range carrier systems for nuclear weapons in Europe no longer came up to the level needed to correspond to such a strategy, and was thus no longer able to check the display of power by the Soviet Union in a crisis situation, the Nato partners decided in 1979 to modernise their longer-range regional nuclear warhead systems.

This programme of up to 572 nuclear warheads and medium-range projectiles was included in the Nato double-decision and served as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

This was linked with a three-fold offer for stable security with fewer nuclear weapons than in the alliance's arsenals up to that time:

I. Withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads from American depots in Europe. This was effected at the end of 1980.

II. Reduction to the number of new weapon systems (on a piecemeal basis) to between 572 and zero.

III. Renunciation by Nato of its instrument for the optimisation of its flexible response strategy; it would do away with weapons which could cover those military objects in the western part of the Soviet Union which are of considerable importance for organising, supporting and intensifying large-scale military operations against Western Europe.

This renunciation of the means of effecting a strategy of deterrence and the offer to reduce and limit the number of such means to 572 can be of considerable value to both sides if the Soviet Union realises and accepts the mutual advantage of reciprocity.

Siberian grey area . . . certainly not in interests of Europe

The offer by the Nato partner countries compromises no less than an act of self-restraint, restraining from resorting to the means of stalling the Soviet land and air forces so dangerous to Western Europe, the so-called 2nd Strategic Attack Echelons of the Warsaw Pact (the section of the Soviet army which in the event of war would close in on the West, — Ed.).

This means abandoning the stability to seal off advancing Soviet forces. The need to set up medium-range missiles in Europe for this purpose became all the more pressing with the international American superiority losing ground in the field of intercontinental weapons. This offer, however, presupposes that the Soviet Union acknowledges similar security needs on the part of Western European countries.

This would be the only real basis for agreement.

This basis also implies that the rights and upper limits of both negotiating partners' land-based medium-range weapons be laid down right from the start. The level of arms can be fixed between zero level and a higher parity ceiling. An agreement aimed at reducing levels step-by-step to zero level is quite

conceivable in the interests of mutual and balanced security.

If such agreement were reached, other weapon systems such as aircraft carriers and carriers of short-range offensive weapons could be equally included in such limitation efforts.

This possibility reveals the perspective of this approach: the strategic offer of mutual self-restraint on the basis of a balanced arms situation could eventually cover all arms including conventional forces and, of course, the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe on both sides.

Important for European security in this respect and for the effectiveness of arms control as a factor of stability in East-West relations is the renunciation by the Soviet Union of its continental offensive and threat option, i.e. of the offensive potential of its SS-20 missiles.

The stationing of 22-20s represents (ignoring the still existing 250 older medium-range models SS-4 and SS-5) with its already positioned 243 SS-20s (234 of which are definitely ready-for-use) such an independent continental strategic option.

The number of warheads ready-for-use figures at about 700 (not counting the reload stock), which is much higher than the level below which the classification as a decisive strategic factor would be unjustified.

The orders of magnitude suggested in Soviet offers, 162 or 150 SS-20s with 3 warheads each, still represent an independent offensive and threat potential regardless of the available, intercontinental missiles of variable range and those of shorter range.

The Soviet Union, therefore, would have to cut down the number of its SS-20s substantially. The question then arises: what about the transfer of surplus SS-20s to Asia? Europe and the United States cannot ignore the subsequent strategic threat to other regions.

The strain on relations with China and Japan cannot solely be seen from an American point of view. Things must be straightened out before the upholding of the agreement by the Soviet Union can be verified.

A Siberian grey area for the stationing of SS-20s on road-mobile and air-transferable SS-20 systems, with the Transsiberian railway serving as a mobile axis between the East and the West, would certainly not be in the interests of European security and stability in arms control.

The zero option also remains the optimal solution for verification purposes. If, however, the Soviet Union were not willing to renounce the use of its SS-20s, it would have to make acceptable suggestions for a bilateral parity level for the United States and the Soviet Union including the limitation of SS-20s in Asia, one which is verifiable.

The Soviet suggestion made in Geneva to include the French and British strategic weapons systems in considerations on Eurostrategic East-West balance is an attempt to cover up Soviet superiority, to obtain international recognition of the Soviet privilege to possess modern land-based medium-range missiles, to squeeze America out of Europe as a nuclear power and to maintain the continental strategic offensive capacity

of the SS-20s, as an independent and offensive potential.

This potential is intended for the Soviet Union to decide by merely threatening to use military potential and to replace political policy factor by the fear of war on the weaker party.

At the same time, the object of such a war is maintained as a alternative.

This is precisely the challenge which endangers the defence of Western Europe and the North Atlantic alliance.

The chances for negotiations now will depend on whether the world is still using the oceans as a radioactive refuse tip. Tankers keep pouring waste into the sea and the results can be seen on many beaches.

Another, more insidious, form of dumping is radioactive waste. And this is even illegal. It is legally grounded in the London Dumping Convention which was signed by 52 countries in two-party framework of negotiations.

Another prerequisite is that victims back down from their original demand that the 255 French systems (including 162 SS-20s) be added to the general quota.

The original intention was to put an international contract regulating marine pollution of the world's seas.

Organisms living in the sea account for over two thirds of the world's oxygen and an ever-increasing amount of world's food supply is made up of crustaceans, seaweed and algae.

Although the London Dumping Convention tried to take this situation into account, the parties to the agreement are not willing to set up a barrier preventing them from finding an easy way of disposing of dangerous waste, materials, most of which they could not get rid of on land, or only at great expense.

For this reason, the Convention allows radioactive waste of weak and intermediate intensity to be dumped in the oceans.

For years now, Britain, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland have taken advantage of the situation. Up to now they have dumped almost 100,000 tons of atomic waste in an area about 700 kilometres north-west of the Spanish coast, and this figure increases by 15,000 tons each year. The first country to actively practise this disputed method of waste disposal was the USA.

Up until 1960 it dumped nuclear waste along the California and also Atlantic coast.

A study by San Francisco's municipal administration at the end of the seventies revealed that contrary to predictions the nuclear material had not distributed itself evenly in the sea.

Much of it had penetrated into the seabed sediments, creating a source of intense radioactive radiation.

Sea organisms taken from this area, which are eaten by human beings, were plutonium-contaminated. The results of this study bucked up efforts by the two South Sea states, Nauru and Kiribati, to

stop the use of radioactive waste.

Although this does not contradict the wording of the London Dumping Convention, it does run contrary to its spirit. It marks a desperate attempt at coming to terms with the drawbacks of nuclear energy usage.

Christian Schneider

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 February 1983)

13 March 1983

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
THE GERMAN TRIBUNE

9

THE ENVIRONMENT

Earth's great radioactive rubbish dump

Süddeutsche Zeitung



Waste not, want not

This DM350m complex near Recklinghausen, in the Ruhr, is the first plant in Germany designed to recover usable raw material from waste. It processes 600,000 tons of household garbage, 90,000 tons of bulky refuse and 35,000 tons of industrial waste a year.

(Photo: amw)

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Meteorological stations all over the world



supplied the data arranged in see-at-a-glance tables in these new reference works. They include details of air and water temperature, precipitation, humidity, sunshine, physical stress of climate, wind conditions and frequency of thunderstorms.

These figures compiled over the years are invaluable both for planning journeys to distant countries and for scientific research.

Basic facts and figures for every country in the world form a preface to the tables. The emphasis is on the country's natural statistics, on climate, population, trade and transport.

The guides are handy in size and flexibly bound, indispensable for daily use in commerce, industry and the travel trade.

Two volumes are already in print. They are: North and South America, 172 pp., DM 22.80; Asia/Australia, 240 pp., DM 24.80.

They will be followed in March 1983 by:

Africa, app. 115 pp., DM 19.80; Europe/USSR, app. 190 pp., DM 24.80.

Look it up in Brockhaus

Lothar Riehl
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 Marz 1983)

Tougher steps to combat water pollution have been urged by the chief of BGW, Germany's gas and water supply association.

Fritz Gläser told a conference that those responsible for introducing the pollution should be required to pay for its removal.

He said that a lot of spring, ground and sea water was poor because of industrial effluent, communal sewage, excessive fertilisation by farmers and the existence of special refuse tips containing toxic wastes.

Herr Gläser's warning comes in the wake of a report by the West German Preservation of Nature Group.

It warned in a report that large areas of the floodplains of the Lower Rhine,

Unfortunately, no efficient and economical purification methods for removing nitrates has been developed.

Altogether, 96 percent of West Germany's population receive pure drinking water.

However, the water experts did not hide the fact that there are some water works where little is known about the source water.

Sometimes, the control procedure just about comes up to legal provisions. As there are a number of unsolved problems in this field, a report by the West German Ministry of the Interior states that future dangers to the supply of drinking water cannot be excluded.

Most people had no reason to worry. Water was still the most strictly con-

cerned meeting of the Convention signatories, to effect a ban on dumping nuclear waste. However, objections by Britain, the USA, Holland and Switzerland put an end to such hopes.

The arguments put forward opposing such plans are fatally reminiscent of arguments voiced in West Germany opposing measures to stop the deaths of trees.

Scientific research needs more time to discover whether such moves are essential. This attitude doesn't exactly show a great deal of responsibility.

For in reality the world's oceans, and in particular the deep-sea, make up a little-known eco-system. This should be reason enough to stop indiscriminate dumping activities. The latter should at least be postponed until more definite research findings emerge, a suggestion put forward by Spain.

The fact that only now has a more rigid control of packaging and dumping nuclear waste been decided upon should make us prick up our ears.

Britain is reported to making attempts to obtain more generous levels for weak and intermediate radioactive waste. The fact that the Federal Republic of Germany abstained in London and Britain, Switzerland and the USA said no is no coincidence.

These countries have commissioned an International Seabed Working Group (SWG) to look into the possibility of final storage of highly radioactive waste on the sea-bed.

Although this does not contradict the wording of the London Dumping Convention, it does run contrary to its spirit. It marks a desperate attempt at coming to terms with the drawbacks of nuclear energy usage.

Christian Schneider

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 February 1983)

the Ruhr, Ems, Wupper and Werra rivers were contaminated by cadmium and lead.

Water supplies in Bavaria were found to have nitrate contents higher than the EEC limit. The blame was laid on over-fertilisation of fields and vineyards.

Herr Gläser told the meeting that despite the heavy pollution in some areas, the impression that German waters were all polluted should be avoided.

Most people had no reason to worry. Water was still the most strictly con-

Karl Stankiewicz
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 2 March, 1983)

■ CIVIL EMERGENCY

Old Mother Hubbard will be too late if she waits until the dreaded Day X

More than 33 years have passed since the German food ration-cards issued during and after the Second World War disappeared into history's waste paper basket.

The 137th "ration period" in May 1950 saw the end of the era of officially administered deprivation, which has lasted almost 11 years.

Was it really the last farewell? The comprehensive emergency programme developed by the German government in preparation for a conceivable (in reality, this should read "inconceivable") "X-day" would suggest that it was not.

In official safes kept under lock and key new food and milk ration-cards lie waiting to be distributed if the worst does indeed come to the worst and an emergency situation should eventuate.

The provision of foodstuff reserves and the elaboration of administrative measures are also parts of overall planning. The official reserves are to be complemented by stocks held by private citizens.

The storing of such private stocks, once encouraged under the name "Operation Squirrel", is particularly important if disruptions occur at a local level only — for example, if areas are cut off by snow or floods.

They are also of value in peacetime if food supply crises are caused by strikes (lorry drivers and railwaymen). However, if things become more serious, if a crisis looks due to political or military threat, time will tell whether Rolf Solmecke and Dr Hans-Joachim Wolter together with their colleagues in the Food Supply Department of the Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture have done their homework properly.

The closely-guarded secretive operation in the official Bonn-Südforst offices is part of the overall civil defence programme and is therefore closely linked to Nato planning.

This account for the "reserved caution" in answering questions on this subject: The stocks of grain and forage cereals, which make up the national reserves and are located throughout Germany, are regarded as top-secret.

It is also virtually impossible to elicit exact figures on these "Civil Defence Reserves" from the gentlemen responsible.



RHEINISCHE POST

Wochenschrift für die Rheinlande

und Westfalen

■ EXHIBITIONS

Rhineland and the Viking connection



In the Year of Our Lord 883, the Normans, having come from Denmark, took their ships up the Rhine with Godfred's approval," wrote the chronicler Abbot Regino.

"Having taken oppidum Duisburg, they erected a fortress in their accustomed manner and remained there throughout the winter. Prince Heinrich rallied an army against them, preventing them from undertaking plundering forays in the vicinity.

"As spring came, they burned down their camp and withdrew to the coast."

The City of Duisburg owes Abbot Regno the first exact dated mention in writing.

But Duisburg had been settled long before then. In fact, as far back as 800 BC people had been making use of the fertile soil and the favourable position of the area at the confluence of two rivers.

What attracted the Normans to Duisburg was not only their hope of establishing a flourishing trading centre,

and of plundering the king's possessions but also the fact that this was a perfect place from which to control the length of the Rhine and the mouth of the Ruhr.

Duisburg's Niederrheinisches Mu-

seum seized upon the 1,100th anniversary of the first mention of the city as a welcome opportunity to present an exhibition on the history and culture of the Vikings whose looting raids in the Rhineland were notorious. This also provided an opportunity to present the early history of Duisburg.

The combination of the two themes of the exhibition is only seemingly weird. The connecting link is Abbot Regno's chronicle, which deals with both the city and the Vikings.

The Norman raid 1,100 years ago has given this drab industrial city a chance to profit a bit from the grimly romantic and savage charm of the blonde, daredevils from the far north...

The show, though not large in terms of floor area, is well worth seeing. Most of the 84 items on exhibit are on loan from the Leningrad Eremitage, Britain's Yorkshire Museum, the Copenhagen National Museum and many German institutions.

The items have been assembled into a vivid depiction of Viking culture, clothing, jewellery, weapons, replicas of settlements and ships and maps showing their campaign routes.

Much information is also provided in the form of photographs, replicas and original artefacts on the Vikings' religion, burial rites and script.

Many more ornate exhibitions have been less educational than the Duisburg show. The relatively small though excellent catalogue is likely to become a coveted handbook on the Vikings.

To fully do justice to the achievement of the organisers of the Duisburg exhibition, it must be borne in mind that they had very little material to fall back on that would relate to the actual theme they had in mind: The Vikings on the Rhine.

There are plenty of written documents dating back to the 9th and 10th centuries that describe how the Norman adventurers took their swift flat-bottomed boats as far as Cologne in 839/40. There are also descriptions of how they raided and fired other cities along the Rhine. But there are virtually no archaeological finds relating to the Rhine forays.

This has several reasons. The most important one is probably that these nomads of the sea — unlike in York, northern France, Sicily and Iceland — never really settled along the Rhine. As a result, there are no graves of Norman nobility nor any of those treasures that indigenous settlers would have buried for safekeeping from the looters.

The Viking treasure trove of Cuerdale in England with its more than 10,000 coins and 1,000 lbs of silver is a typical example of this type of buried treasure. It is also the world's biggest find of this nature.

Naturally, the Vikings could have left all sorts of amulets, coins or even swords behind in their winter camps near Duisburg, Koblenz and Trier. After all, they often enough had to retreat in great haste. The problem for the archaeologists is that the exact location of these camps has never been pinpointed. Moreover, for safety reasons, the Vikings liked to sit it out on river islands that have meanwhile disappeared.

Another reason for the scarcity of archaeological finds is simply that research into the Viking era needs intensifying. This would require more systematic digging in settlements — which happens to be particularly costly.

The archaeological digs in downtown Duisburg only became possible when the Public Works Department dug up city streets to lay new water pipes.

The amount of work that still remains to be done in this field of archaeological research is evidenced by the fact that only six per cent of the famous Hedeby settlement in Germany's far north has so far been thoroughly sifted and analysed.

In his catalogue essay, Wilhelm Jansen speaks of the "undisguised greed" of the Vikings. They were not only after coins, but also after people for sale on the slave markets.

Those proud Norsemen who settled in Iceland had been escapees from King Harold.


So far as the Rhineland is concerned, however, it is obvious that the Vikings went there were not looking for arable land. They attacked only where there was a promise of rich booty: monasteries, fortresses and cities that were known for their wealth during the Carolingian Age.

In his catalogue essay, Wilhelm Jansen speaks of the "undisguised greed" of the Vikings. They were not only after coins, but also after people for sale on the slave markets.

There is an ever new crop of art historians who maintain that one of the other fortress was built as a protective measure against the Normans. But this has clearly been proved only in the case



Viking settlement in Duisburg in AD 883. Model by R. Szymczak, of Duisburg.



This altar covering from a church in Worden dates from AD 750. It is influenced by the Vikings.

of Bonn, where the old Roman fortifications were restored in the year 881 to ward off the northern predators.

For the rest, there is every likelihood that the Viking researcher Wilhelm Janssen has a point. He maintains that the noblemen along the lower reaches of the Rhine did not build their fortresses against the Vikings but against the forays of their neighbours.

One of the reasons why the Vikings have progressed little and complaining about the difficulties caused by the language barrier and difficulty of examining foreign men due to their cultural background.

It is quite possible that becoming accustomed to the German social welfare system and a different attitude towards the square sail that made work in Germany plays a certain role in the absence rate. But this in itself provides no adequate explanation.

It is a known fact that foreigners are more prone to certain ailments that appear to be solely due to their particular situation.

For instance, they are more prone to psychosomatic disorders of the digestive tract (especially in the second year of their stay in Germany) and the cardiovascular system.

Speculation to the effect that the fighting spirit of the Vikings in People living in dormitory accommodation without their families are much more susceptible than others.

Treatment is difficult and often impossible because thorough familiarity with the patient's language is essential for the treatment problems that have psychological roots. It is therefore very rare for patients to receive psychotherapeutic treatment. Only family doctors who have known the patient for a long time and a reasonable chance of success.

Attempts to overcome the language barrier through foreign doctors practised both a silver pendant in areas heavily populated by pronounced, symmetrical European countrymen have failed because head of a moustached Viking Brooks, Turks or Yugoslavs have a bias against their own doctors and prefer to be treated by Germans.

The stress resulting from the move to a strange country, from a rural area to a city and separation from the next-of-kin is possible to pinpoint and define.

And the slum atmosphere in which many foreigners are forced to live acts as an incubator for latent psychological disorders.

It has been established that people living alone, those with little or no education and those who suffer from the gap between the hoped for and the actually achieved social status are psychologically at risk.

More than half of the foreign workers in Germany say that homesickness is the worst of their problems.

Their drive to decorate every inch with bizarre forms and figures, as their mythology and drive to venture forth.

No matter how one looks at it, the artistic heritage left behind by the Vikings (the name means "bay people" *vik* being the old Norwegian word) can only be termed "impressive".

Their crude burial rites, as witnessed by Arab envoys, complete with drinking orgies, rape of widows, human sacrifice, in no way detract from the great achievement of having set up world-wide trading routes.

Especially in southern Europe, there is a feeling of safety within the clan. The future is predictable and can be controlled in these circumstances. But this very feeling of safety prevents the development of the mechanisms needed to adapt to entirely different conditions

MEDICINE

The stresses and strains of being foreign take a heavy toll

because, while at home, all responsibility rests with the clan.

The clash with an alien society in a strange country therefore frequently overtakes people who left home for one reason only: to make money.

The inability to integrate in the new surroundings is an added stress factor which, together with the feeling that the future is outside one's control, can lead to illness.

The end result is that the home country becomes idealized and the host country is rejected. This kind of situation leads to depression and psychosomatic symptoms.

Homesickness must once have been even more pronounced than today. People who did not die of homesickness frequently committed suicide or deliberately took upon themselves grave dangers in a bid to get back home, as 17th century literature on Swiss mercenaries serving European potentates shows.

Then homesickness was generally referred to as nostalgia. In fact, even Goethe mentions the dire consequences of homesickness in a 1774 letter to Lu-

Gathering at railway stations as a symbolic act of being closer to home is not the only expression of homesickness among foreign workers in Germany. The same applies to their search for persons they trust (like social workers, clergymen or doctors).

The extreme discrepancy between two cultures explains the tendency among foreign workers to isolate themselves. It also explains their psychological disorders and their homesickness.

These people frequently become figures that replace the mother back home.

The widespread use of charms and amulets among foreigners is another way of escaping loneliness and keeping the memory of home alive.

Larbig compares this with what he calls the voodoo death which is fairly common among so-called primitive societies when a taboo has been violated.

With people who have strong religious and family ties, leaving home can be tantamount to violating established standards — a problem these people find hard to overcome.

He found that the frequency of psy-

chosomatic disorders of the digestive tract and the cardiovascular system varied from group to group.

Germans working abroad were least affected. He attributes the differences to social status. Most of the Germans he interviewed were academics working as specialists and most were successful.

More than two-thirds of the Japanese and Greeks felt that they were discriminated against, while the Germans abroad had no feeling of discrimination whatsoever; nor did they feel homesick.

On the other hand, 93 per cent of the Greeks and 14 per cent of the Japanese said that they were homesick.

More than 50 per cent of the Greeks and Japanese as opposed to 22 per cent of the Germans were receiving medical treatment for disorders with psychological backgrounds.

Cultural differences between the home and the host country have a major impact that has nothing to do with the friendliness or otherwise a person meets with abroad.

The Japanese language has an untranslatable term *amae* that expresses the need for dependence and social ties.

In Western civilisation such needs are seen in a rather negative light and brushed aside as puerile.

The extreme discrepancy between two cultures explains the tendency among foreign workers to isolate themselves. It also explains their psychological disorders and their homesickness.

A foreign worker suffering from depression told Larbig that his stay in the host country was "a slow death," highlighting the threat of change from one society to another poses.

Larbig compares this with what he calls the voodoo death which is fairly common among so-called primitive societies when a taboo has been violated.

With people who have strong religious and family ties, leaving home can be tantamount to violating established standards — a problem these people find hard to overcome.

Next year's congress on rheumatology research is to be held in Belgium.

The congress devoted a great deal of attention to a new English language periodical, "Clinical Rheumatology", that provides the latest clinical and research findings.

The publication is circulated worldwide. It is well illustrated and continues and amplifies where "Acta Rheumatologica Belgica" left off.

The papers read at the Mainz congress will be published in "Clinical Rheumatology" and the magazine will also provide important contact addresses of specialists.

Elisabeth Stell-Beuerle (Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 23 February 1983)

Attempts at remedying the situation should therefore concentrate on giving the foreign worker a feeling of security and confidence and on making his future more predictable and controllable.

A doctor, for instance, could try to strengthen certain personality traits that would make it easier for the patient to cope with a strange environment.

Chicago University psychologists have defined personality traits that provide protection from psychological disorders in stress situations. These traits include the willingness to face a social challenge, personal commitment, belief in the meaningfulness of one's own actions and open-mindedness towards social change.

Promoting these traits and attitudes would not only make it easier for a foreigner to adapt to the ways of his host country but would also protect him from homesickness and the psychosomatic disorders that go with it.

Margot Behrends

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 24 February 1983)

Shedding light on rheumatism

Causes, course and genetic aspects of rheumatism were the main topics at the 3rd International Rheumatism Congress in Mainz. The meeting was attended by more than 100 experts from all parts of Europe, including the East Bloc.

Basic research received as much attention as clinical experience.

Spontaneously occurring rheumatism in animals can provide valuable information on the causes and the course of the disease in humans.

The congress also dealt with the processes that take place in rheumatic joints and ways and means of controlling them.

With it all, the actual roots of most types of rheumatism still remain to be pinpointed. There is, however, hope that new therapies will be developed in the course of research.

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All in the mind

The World Congress on Psychosomatic Medicine in July will for the first time be held in Germany: in Hamburg.

Some 1,000 delegates are expected to attend. The Congress will deal, among other things, with the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic treatment and its integration into general medicine and traumatic life experiences — such as unemployment — as causes of psychosomatic ailments.

(Rheinische Post, 23 February 1983)

Some 100,000 Hamburg schoolchildren aged between 12 and 16 will be delivering official letters to their parents in the next few weeks.

The letter is only one part of the Hamburg drive that has been dubbed "Talking with Each Other — Living with Each Other" and will cost the city an estimated DM180,000.

Against payment of DM10, the parents can order two cassette recordings giving examples of typical "crisis discussions" within the family and suggestions for a sensible settlement of disputes. Each cassette is accompanied by an information booklet.

Hamburg's Health Senator Helga Elstner sees the information sheet as a necessity to adapt to the new approach in that its target is not the children but the parents.

All surveys show that the extent to which children are at risk largely depends on family atmosphere. Drug abuse is greatest among children who feel uncomfortable at home.

Surveys also show that young people who resort to drugs and drink have a

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 17 February 1983)

It was something of a surprise that no radical political ideas were put forward by any of the speakers at a meeting of unemployed people in Bad Boll.

About 80 people attended the meeting, which was organised by the Protestant Academy.

However, one speaker did say that action groups formed by the jobless could become political. And some hecklers said that unemployment was a capitalist sickness and that the whole system needed to be changed.

There was also a threatening undercurrent in the posters on display ("Jobless does not mean defenceless").

A Protestant Academy spokesman estimates that there are about 300 organisations for the unemployed in Germany. Twenty-five were represented at Bad Boll.

The fact is that, despite mass unemployment, the jobless are still looked upon as social outcasts who are too lazy to work.

Some of the delegates at the meeting have never had a job. They went on the dole straight from school. Others, especially old people, have been out of work for years.

While older people tend to throw in the towel, the young ones rebel and often try to do something, such as forming action groups.

They are not prepared to be viewed as outcasts by the rest of society. Their idea is to retain their self-respect through the groups they form.

The national congress of jobless in Frankfurt last December was something like a signal. A tide of widely varying action groups has grown since then.

Klaus Füller of the Protestant Academy, who chaired the Bad Boll meeting and who has been dealing with

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Was ist in Portugal?

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Was ist in Polen?

Was ist in Tschechoslowakei?

Was ist in Jugoslawien?

Was ist in Rumänien?

Was ist in Bulgarien?

Was ist in Albanien?

Was ist in Griechenland?

Was ist in Irland?

Was ist in Irland?